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Clinical Pathways to Ethically Substantive Autonomy 
 
Phil Drake and Stuart Toddington 
 
The Law School, The  University of Huddersfield 
 
 
There is no shortage of support for the idea that ethics should be 
incorporated into the academic and professional curriculum.  There is a 
difference, however, between, on   the one hand,   teaching   
professionals   about ethics, and, on the other, demanding that   they   
give ethical expression to the range of professional skills they are 
expected to apply daily in their work.  If this expression is not to be 
perfunctory, ethical judgement must be genuinely integrated into the 
professional skill set. The mark of integration in this  regard  is the 
capacity for autonomous judgement.  Ethical autonomy cannot be 
achieved by a mechanical, rule-bound and circumstance-specific 
checklist of ethical do’s and don'ts,   and it is only partially achieved by a 
move from mechanistic rules to ‘outcome based’ processes.1 Rather,  
professional ethical autonomy presupposes not only a formal 
understanding of the requirements of an  ethical  code of conduct,   but a 
genuine engagement with the  substantive  values and techniques  that  
enable practitioners to interpret and apply principles confidently over a 
range of circumstances.  It is not then, that ethical skill is not valued 
by the legal profession or legal education, or that the shortfall of 
ethical skill goes unacknowledged, it is rather that the   language of 
professional ethics struggles to break free from the cautious 
circularity that is the mark of its formal expression. To require a 
professional to ‘act in their client's interests’,  or ‘act in accordance 
                                                          
1
     The new SRA Handbook  emphasises a move to 'outcomes focused 
regulation'. In this document the SRA say: 
“Responsibility for meeting the requirements in the Handbook, and for operating 
effective systems and processes, lies with you. In the SRA Code of Conduct (the 
Code) in particular, we have stripped out a lot of the detail of the previous Code 
to empower you to implement the right systems and controls for your clients and 
type of practice. You will have more flexibility in how you achieve the right 
outcomes for your clients, which will require greater judgement on your part.” 
This reference to greater judgement  [on the part of the practising lawyer]  is 
clearly an acknowledgement that autonomy is  now  necessary in ethical skill 
application.  This is to be welcomed, or point is simply that no amount of 
contingent examples of ethical rule application can impart the attribute of 
autonomy to a learner. (See S.3.2 )@  http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-
in-practice/OFR/ofr-quick-guide.page 
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with the expectations of the profession’ or act ‘fairly and 
effectively’ are  formal, infinitely ambiguous and entirely safe 
suggestions; to offer a substantive account of what, specifically, 
those interests might be, or what  expectations we should have, are 
rather more contentious. Fears of dogma and a narrowing of 
discretion do, of course, accompany the idea of a search for ethical 
substance, and caution is to be expected in response to it. 
Notwithstanding these anxieties, there would appear to be no 
coherent alternative to the aspiration to substantive autonomy, and 
this   must remain the goal of teaching legal ethics. In light of this, 
the problem facing educationalists is then perhaps expressed more 
diplomatically in terms of how ethical skill might be substantively 
developed, imparted, and integrated into a genuinely 
comprehensive conception of professional skill.  
Clinical education can go a long way to solving this problem: 
exposure to the practical tasks of lawyering is the surest and   best 
way of raising consciousness in this regard: ‘Hands-on’ is   good - 
and consciousness-raising is a step in the direction of autonomy, 
but raw experience and elevated  awareness  is not enough. We 
know that our  most influential theories of learning tells us that it  
is in the process of reflection upon problem solving that the 
practitioner begins to take autonomous control of skill 
development.2 Reflection, however, requires content and direction, 
and in this paper, with the aid of three models of skill integration 
inspired by Nigel Duncan's detailed analysis and video 
reconstruction of the ethical and technical skill deficiencies 
brought to light by R v Griffiths,3 we attempt to specify what might 
be understood in this regard: Reflective content refers to the 
discrete interests and values that compete to produce tension in 
what we will refer to the ‘matrix’ of concerns  that feature in all 
forms of dispute resolution; reflective  direction points to an 
engagement with the resources and techniques that can empower 
critical and autonomous judgment. In the context of a clinical 
process broadly structured by the insights of Wenger and by Rest’s 
model of ethical skill, 4  guided reflection so specified  thus serves 
                                                          
2
 See David A. Kolb,  Experiential learning : experience as the source of 
learning and development .  (Englewood Cliffs, N.J, London : Prentice-Hall) 
1984 
3 See R v Griffiths [2006] All ER (D) 19. See also Nigel Duncan “Preparing for 
the Challenge of a Corrupt Environment”  ( elfa-
afde.eu/app/download/5788681553/n.duncan.pdf) . See video at  
www.teachinglegalethics.org   under ‘resource library’ - ‘teaching materials’,  
then scroll down to ‘Nigel Duncan’. 
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as an interface between on the one hand, indeterminate ethical 
form, and, on the other, the substantive ethical wisdom to be found 
in the repository of values that underpin the very idea of the legal 
enterprise.  
The Matrix  of  Technical and Ethical Skill: Three Models of 
Integration  
When we introduce the idea of ethical behaviour into the concept 
of professional skill we face a logical problem of greater 
complexity than might first be imagined. Skill-sets can be 
compiled and evaluated simply as linear sets of practical means in 
relation to a given end (task or enterprise). If engineering, for 
example, a range of basic and discrete craft skills might be 
specified and enumerated as a series: measuring, cutting, milling, 
filing, welding and so on; the set might be enlarged as other basic 
skills, or other more advanced skills are added on to the linear 
series. Here the idea of a linear series of skills will be contrasted 
with a systematic or organically integrated set of skills. The linear 
analogy is probably an oversimplification even in basic 
engineering – it is probably true to say that an integrated set of 
basic skills in combination is minimally required to perform any 
engineering task, and so the distinction we seek to establish is 
perhaps a matter of degree. But the problem about ‘adding on’ or 
rather, ‘adding in’ ethical skills to an accepted linear set of 
professional skills or competences, is that ethical skill in the form 
of autonomous moral judgment  does not merely enlarge the set of 
skills and thus increase the range of tasks that might be undertaken. 
Rather, the ethical dimensional of skill application radically and 
qualitatively changes not only the nature of skill application, but 
the criteria by which we might judge the successful (competent 
and skilful) completion of the task in hand. In fact, adding in 
ethical autonomy to the lawyers skill set might profoundly affect 
the understanding of the goals of the entire legal enterprise. That is 
to say, we cannot conceive of skill acquisition for lawyers in linear 
terms, but rather must approach the issue of skills in a holistic way: 
ethical judgement cannot be ‘added in’ or ‘bolted on’ to a skill-set   
it must be suitably integrated.  In relieving the pressure of this 
abstraction we offer three familiar scenarios that highlight certain 
ethical constants (judgments about interests and values) that 
constitute a matrix of concerns common to all lawyer/client 
interactions. There are five such: (a) the interest of the client, (b), 
the provisions of relevant legislation – statute, common law 
principle - practice guidelines, (c) the requirements of the 
professional ethical code, (d), the orthodoxly accepted set of 
                                                                                                                                  
4
 See fn. 18 infra 
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clerical, technical and administrative skills expected of practising 
lawyers, (e), the underlying social or moral purpose of the 
legislation.  The three scenarios present these concerns in a way 
that shows that our understanding of what is to count as ‘skilful 
execution’ and ‘successful outcome’ varies in relation to our 
conception of what constitutes a suitably professional model of 
skill integration and application. 5  The models are drawn from 
reality, but it is their hypothetical or ‘ideal-typical’ validity that is 
important in what follows. The first model (See the video 
reconstruction of stages 1, 2 and 3 of R v Griffiths)6 provides a 
convenient illustration of what we have called the 'the 
automatically integrated' model.  
(i) ‘Automatically’ integrated model 
What we refer to as an ‘automatically integrated’ model occurs 
where prima facie it appears that the client interest, the range of 
orthodox technical skills, and the quality of ethical judgement 
required to tie their application together are all automatically 
entwined. A good example of this is provided by the role play 
corrective to R v Griffiths constructed by Nigel Duncan (See video 
at www.teachinglegalethics.org). Here, an estate agent approaches a 
solicitor with a view to processing the purchase of a property 
appearing on the market at a remarkably low price. The solicitor is 
aware that the vendors had recently been convicted of drug dealing 
and money-laundering and immediately perceived a connection 
between the low selling price of £43,000 (against a market value of 
approximately £150,000) and the attempt to dispose of assets prior 
to potential confiscation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.7  
Despite what actually occurred,8  the  solicitor’s statutory duty in 
this situation could not be clearer: it is to report any such 
suspicion. Similarly, it seems a  straightforward matter for the 
solicitor to point out to the prospective purchaser that it simply 
would not be in their interest to acquire criminal property in this 
regard. It would be inevitably confiscated and very possibly the 
                                                          
5
 By’skill integration’ we are trying to convey the message that Julia Black 
expresses such that ‘ethics is what raises competence to professionalism’.   Julia 
Black  “Legal Education and Training and its Interaction with Regulation”. 
(Paper to the LETR Symposium, Manchester, July 2012 (forthcoming ). 
6
 R v Griffiths [2006] EWCA Crim 2155,. See video at  
www.teachinglegalethics.org  under ‘resource library’ - ‘teaching materials’ 
then scroll down to ‘Nigel Duncan’. See fn 3 supra  
7
 See:  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s.330 (1) ‘Failing to make a required 
disclosure’.  
8
 See  Nigel Duncan “Preparing for the Challenge of a Corrupt Environment” 
(Op.Cit.  fn 3 supra) 
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discrepancy between the selling price and the actual market value 
might be recovered from the client. If this course of action is 
followed,  the  happy coincidence of (a) the interests of the client, 
(b) the  provisions of the statute, (c) the maxims of the professional 
code (d) the technical and administrative competence skills of the 
lawyer, and (e) the underlying purpose of the legislation, come 
together to produce an automatically balanced and cohesive 
solution to the situation. It would require (as it did in the actual 
events leading to the prosecution of the solicitor and the client) a 
determined effort not to act skilfully and   diligently in serving 
cohesively interests (a) - (e).   Thus R v Griffiths provides an 
invaluable general model which, when analysed, serves as an  
interface to a more focused level of reflection: the student or future 
practitioner takes the first step to ethical autonomy when he or she 
becomes aware of the matrix of concerns that lie between (a) – (e). 
Guided reflection can bring these concerns systematically to the 
fore. This contributes not only to elevated  ethical awareness, but 
allows the student  or practitioner to  push beyond the formal 
identification of the problem of skill integration towards the kind 
of knowledge and techniques required to advance substantive 
solutions to it. Models two and three below present this ‘matrix of 
concerns’ in  more  problematic permutation.  
 
(ii) ‘Problematically’ integrated model  
 R v Griffiths provided a convenient illustration of an integrated 
solution and a valuable model to aid our analysis of a problem, but 
most lawyer/client   interactions involve ‘problematically 
integrated’ situations: A good example of this   kind of interaction 
occurs in cases where legal advice and skilful manipulation of 
financial arrangements is required to effect, say, a tax burden 
reduction. Here, ‘the   client interest’ (‘easing’ the tax burden) and 
the technical skills of the tax lawyer or accountant might appear to 
conflict with the apparent clarity of the ethically redistributive and 
progressive intentions of the statute. But  the economic and 
psychological models that form the rationale behind the legislative 
intention are highly contentious.9  In additon,  what might emerge 
as an expression of the client interest is ethically and 
philosophically uncertain ( for example, the client might genuinely 
be appalled by the leniency of the law in this regard and insist on 
                                                          
9
 One need only to refer to the immense controversy arising from proponents 
and critics of supply-side economic's and in particular, the issue of the ‘Laffer 
Curve’  See, for example, Arthur Laffer,  “The Laffer Curve: Past Present and  
Future” ( Heritage Foundation June 1, 2004)  
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/06/the-laffer-curve-past-present-
and-future 
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paying more tax than is legally required) . Here, then the 
integration of the matrix concerns (a) – (e) is disrupted and made 
problematic.  
 
(iii) Unintegrated model  
A third model (drawn from reality, but which could plausibly be 
mooted hypothetically) is a situation where the ‘client interest’ and 
what counts as the ‘technical skill’ of the lawyer are entirely 
antithetical to the universally understood and accepted moral 
intentions of the legislation: i.e., and e.g., ingeniously defending 
torture at Guantánamo Bay for the benefit of providing legal 
immunity for the U.S. military.10 If we assume, ideal-typically, a 
civilised legislative intention and a principled ‘client interest’ in a 
democratic society,11 we have an example of an entirely 
unintegrated  application of technical skill and ethical judgment: 
The ‘skill’ required of lawyers in this situation is what ethical 
common sense would regard as the capacity to subvert or nullify 
the legislative   and democratic purpose of the law to serve the 
immoral and unconstitutional interests of the ‘client’. A fully 
rational  reconstruction of this interaction from an ideal-typically 
‘integrated’ perspective could not, we argue, regard this 
permutation of technical competence, client interest and  ethical  
judgment  as unproblematically  to be regarded as ‘skilful’.12 
 
An Interface Between Ethical Form and Ethical Substance  
When we speak about an integrated approach to legal education in 
this sense of producing a cognitive grasp of the relations between 
skill, interests, legislative intent, and ethical judgment what we are 
striving to do is express a maximally comprehensive notion of high 
professional competence. We noted in our introductory remarks 
that  mechanistic and rule-bound regimes, and a pathologically 
cautious formalism fall short of our aspirations in this regard. 
Ethical skill can sensibly be understood only as a capacity for   
                                                          
10
 See Richard B Builder & Detlev F Vagts, “Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers 
and Torture” (2004) American Society of International Law , at pp 689-695. The 
advice provided was that the President as Commander-in-Chief has 
constitutional authority to disregard treaty or statutory prohibitions on the use of 
torture or other coercive interrogation techniques in conducting the “war on 
terror”. 
11
 The question here, of course, is who is the client? The government and the 
military are archetypal public bodies and  in it could be(should be)  argued law 
have no interests antithetical to the public interest. See in particular “The 
Meaning of Public Authority Under the Human Rights Act” -  Seventh Report of 
Session 2003–04”  in relation to s. 6(3)(b) of the HRA 1998. 
 
12
 This resonates with Julia Black’s aphorism. See fn. 4 supra 
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autonomous, reflective and accomplished ethical judgement - and 
pure form cannot facilitate this autonomy. Endlessly insisting on 
the need for reflection will not magically produce the level of 
accomplishment we desire,  rather we must openly and honestly 
specify the content and direction of reflection. By the same token, 
if the educational task is to develop an understanding of  ethical 
skill, impart it, and and ensure that it becomes integrated into a 
genuinely comprehensive conception of professional skill, we need 
to do more than compile wish-lists of virtues that we would hope 
to find evenly distributed throughout the  profession.  Such lists are 
not to be criticised on the basis of their formalism per se, formal 
articulation of any problem is not only methodologically 
unavoidable, in the context of ethical endeavour it is also vitally 
important to us in creating  as Potter points out,  a universal focus 
of hope.13  
 
Lists of desirable virtues thus provide an initial formal orientation:. 
Rowe et al recently and rightly suggest that our understanding of 
‘professionalism’ ought to   include  a recognition of ‘the broader 
implications of work’. This involves:14 
 
• considering the interests and values 
of clients and others 
• providing high quality services at 
fair cost 
• maintaining independence of 
judgement 
• embodying honour integrity and fair 
play 
• being truthful and candid 
• exhibiting diligence and punctuality 
• showing courtesy and respect 
towards others 
• complying with rules and 
expectations of the profession. 
• Managing law practice effectively 
and efficiently 
• engaging in professional self-
development 
                                                          
13
 See  Potter 2005: 24  
14
 M. Rowe et al “Professionalism in Pre-Practice Legal Education: An Insight 
Into the Universal Nature of Professionalism and the Developemnt of 
Professional Identity.” The Law Teacher (2012 Vol 46 No.2)  pp.123-124 
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• nurturing quality of life 
 
Additionally, ‘professionals’ should support the aims of the legal 
profession by: 
 
 
• providing access to justice 
• upholding the vitality and 
effectiveness of the legal system 
• promoting justice fairness and 
morality 
• and encouraging diversity.  
 
They go on to say that traditional law teaching does little to 
address these values and attributes which could be said “to be at 
the core of lawyers’ professional identity”.15  
 
There is nothing in this list that anyone would wish to disagree 
with; but we should by now be aware that it is the purity of the 
form – quite literally, the absence of substance – that lies behind 
this guarantee of unanimous approval.  Thus despite the unanimity, 
as Rowe et al, point  out, little is done, effectively, to promote 
these virtues. There is no paradox, however,  once  we 
acknowledge that this failure  lies in the inability of legal ethical 
discourse to break free from these formalist constraints. Ironically, 
Rowe’s list  of virtues provide  a good illustration of the problem. 
This is not to criticise tout court what is listed; the analytical 
process, as noted, renders this formal first step logically 
unavoidable in identifying the practical problem and providing a 
systematic orientation to its separable dimensions. Its separable 
dimensions concern, formally,  what might be involved in 
successfully serving ‘the interests and values of clients’ and  
‘others’; of providing ‘high quality’ at a  ‘fair cost’; of encouraging  
‘independence of judgement’; ‘honour integrity and fair play’; of 
meeting ‘expectations of the profession’; ‘professional self-
development’; ‘quality of life’ and so on. But the enumeration of 
these dimensions of the problem is not a solution to the problem, 
nor even an identification of what is required to synthesise a 
solution to the problem. What is enumerated here is   infinitely 
interpretable:  a list of ‘blanks’ that must urgently be ‘filled in’ by 
substantive information.  It seems that these empty formal shells 
cry out for substantive ethical content, but that we are condemned 
to proceed in circles, trying to fathom what, concretely, it means to 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. Rowe Law Teacher  p. 123,4 
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teach lawyers to be ‘fair’, ‘effective’, ‘honourable’ and what is 
entailed by making them aware of the ‘broader implications of 
their work’.  
 
Progress beyond this formalism - progress towards professional 
ethical skill seen as substantive ethical autonomy – demands of us 
that we engage with what we are now naturally conditioned to 
avoid: ‘value-judgments’, ‘essentially contested concepts’ or 
‘metaphysical’ notions. We live, as Alisdair MacIntyre16 pointed 
out, in an age of Emotivism: a world where   philosophical 
orthodoxy  - and the post-rational rejection of the orthodoxy -  both 
regard the engagement with concrete value as not a proper topic of 
rational or ‘scientific’ discussion. Hope, however, lies in the fact 
that law, in a profound sense, accepts this moral impasse and 
attempts to fashion and stabilize justificatory norms as a response 
to the potential for disagreement inevitably arising from it. Given 
this, there is no reason why  we should not  find answers to what is 
skilful, fair, effective and honourable within the practice of law by 
looking at the values that underpin the practical wisdom of the 
very idea of law. We find this suggestion increasingly in 
contemporary policy discourse  concerned with the future of the 
profession,17 but we also find it throughout the history of 
philosophy – from Aristotle to Aquinas, from Kant to Hume, and 
in the under-utilized genius of Lon L.Fuller. It is the idea that 
specific and particular problems relating to ethical means might be 
resolved by examining the generality of our   ultimate ends.  
 
A Clinical Context for Guided Reflection 
Our aim has been to articulate the nature of the interface that is 
required to connect the formal and unspecified acknowledgement 
of the importance of ethical skill with the substantive values 
required to bring about an autonomous understanding of them.  
This interface consists in what we have identified as the context 
and direction of guided reflection provided by familiarity with the 
‘matrix of concerns’ that points practitioners towards underlying 
values. This guided reflection must operate within a suitable 
structure of clinical learning, and   Donald Nicholson18 has done 
                                                          
16
 Alisdair MacIntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd. Edition, 
Duckworth, London) 1982,  pp.6-10. 
17
 See fn. 23 infra 
18
 See Nicolson, Donald J  Teaching Ethics Clinically,  (Teaching Ethics 
Clinically Without Breaking the Bank,) (2012)., -  
www.teachinglegalethics.org   -  and more generally  “Making Lawyers 
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much to forge a widespread acceptance of the general model which 
is shaped by the various insights of Wenger, Rest, and Merrit.19 
Wenger’s notion of a ‘community of practice’ is perhaps the 
central structural consideration in modern educational theory. 
Learning occurs through a combination of the influence of the 
cultural environment and the process of negotiating meaning 
through participation and reification within this environment.  But 
an ethically pristine ‘community of practice’ does not arise 
spontaneously and automatically, ready to guide inexorably and  
productively  towards autonomy.  It should, of course, as 
Nicholson insists, encourage the kind of developmental virtues 
outlined in  Rest’s model: the  moral sensitivity,  capable 
judgement, active commitment and courage required by ‘altru-
ethical’ professionalism.20 But these virtues must function as much 
as the ability to resist institutional norms and pressures as   to act 
in conformity with them; this is obvious,  for a  community can can 
just as easily discourage and repress moral development as it can 
promote and sustain it. Thus autonomous ethical judgement must 
work from within and upon the community if it is to provide what 
Merrit refers to as a ‘sustaining social contribution to character, 21 
and this points us to to substantive foundations and to the notion of 
a source of  autonomous ethical insight prior to community. To be 
sure, there is a dialectic at work here, but not a paradox: reflection 
leads to autonomy, but reflection must be guided by substantive 
insight. This is best explained by augmenting Wenger and 
modifying Rest by introducing what Vigotsky refers to as the ‘zone 
of proximal development’.22 This high-tec phrase simply denotes 
                                                                                                                                  
Moral : Ethical Codes and Moral Character”  ( Legal Studies Vol .25, No. 4, 
2005)  pp. 601-626 
 
19
 Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice : Learning Meaning and Identity 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998);  Rest, J . ‘Background: Theory 
and Research’. In Moral Development in the Professions J.R.Rest & D.Narvaez 
Eds .(Hillsdale, NJ: Ehrlbaum. 1994) pp.1-26; Maria Merrit “Virtue Ethics and 
Situationist Personality Psychology” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3, 365 
– 383, 2000)   
20
 See fn. 16 supra 
21
 See  Maria Merrit “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology” 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3, 365 – 383, 2000)   
22
  See  L. S Vygotsky  Mind in society: The Development of Higher 
Psychological Processes. ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.)  
p.86).  Saul McLeod, says:  The zone of proximal development ... has been 
defined as "the distance between the actual developmental level as determined 
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that part of the process wherein a learner is empowered to achieve 
something by being provided with   guidance without which they 
would have been unable to progress. Subsequent to this 
intervention and guidance, the zone of proximal development 
(proximate to the guidance or guide) becomes the zone of actual 
development. For our purposes, and in the context of ethical 
learning, the zone of actual development can be understood as 
progress towards the skills of ethical autonomy.  
 
The Ethical Dynamism of Law 
When ethical reflection becomes focused it goes in search of 
substantive principle, when it finds it, substantive principle informs 
clinical judgement;  we begin to move from ethical awareness in 
the simple practical involvement with a task to the beginnings of 
an autonomous understanding of the task and what is required for 
its comprehensive resolution.  The  formally  irreproachable values 
of ethical professionalism  attain a concrete and dynamic 
importance when through an interface they connect with the 
repository of the  ethically substantive.  We have suggested that 
critical engagement with the ‘matrix of concern’s points us in the 
direction of a repository of values that expansively underpin the 
idea of law itself. This is undoubtedly the right direction, as those 
charged with charting the future of the profession now seem to 
accept,23 and this  sounds a lot like a job for ‘Jurisprudence’.  One 
can expect  antipathies to the colonization of legal ethics by 
Jurisprudence, and unease about the association between dogma 
                                                                                                                                  
by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as 
determined through problem solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration 
with more capable peers"  See S.A. McLeod  The Zone of Proximal 
Development. http://www.simplypsychology.org/Zone-of-Proximal-
Development.html  
 
23
 In paragraphs  87 -89 of the LETR Discussion Paper 02/2012 at p. 30 we find:  
“Both the ACLEC Report and the more recent Economides and Rogers Report 
(2009), in their recommendations to bring ethics into the initial or academic 
stage of training for solicitors, have raised uncertainties about what that implies. 
Are we talking about individual professional ethics, per se, are we addressing 
the institutional ethical roles of the professions, judges and lawyers as a 
collectivity, or are we primarily concerned with the ‘system ethics’ and values 
of law itself? This is reflected in Boon’s (2011) definition of legal ethics as...  
 
The study of the relationship between morality  and Law, the 
values underpinning the legal system, and the regulation of the 
legal services market, including the institutions, professional 
roles and ethics of the judiciary and legal professions. ....  
 
If we accept that definition, all of these options are possible...”  
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and ethical substance, to intensify at this stage of the discussion. 
But this should not tempt us to evade or obscure the fact that the 
discipline of legal ethics appears  to acknowledge  that progress 
beyond mechanism and formalism must do more to connect the   
concept  of   professionalism with the theoretical   relationship 
between legality and morality.  This is the relationship  that  
underpins  the respect for individual worth implicit (and explicit) 
in  the commitment to the  Rule of Law. This is not to suggest that  
legal validity – even from the Idealist’s perspective – is to be 
regarded as synonymous with   moral validity, nor is it to assume 
that professional legal ethics is simply another word for 
Jurisprudence and/or Moral Philosophy.  In fact, to be effective, 
legal ethics must be circumscribed and differentiated as a 
discipline from the purely  philosophical sciences. However, it 
must answer the questions it appears centrally to set itself - 
especially about its rationale and method – and   if in so doing, it 
must inevitably draw on the philosophical sciences, it must 
acknowledge its debt to them.  
 
In approaching our concluding remarks on this problem, however, 
it is worth noting that one very important substantive value is 
presented to us as a fait accompli  requiring no philosophical effort 
of analysis whatsoever, namely the constitutional and moral issue 
of access to justice. It is in the context of a much reduced legal aid 
budget that our clinical students will encounter the general public 
and their legal needs. Whatever ‘justice’ might be, ‘access to it’ in 
a world of commodified  legal services and limited funding 
generally means ‘being able to hire a skilled legal representative’ 
or  be provided with one free of charge. On the premise that 
‘access to justice’ in a constitutional system of laws (i.e. all such 
systems) means ideally, access to all who require it, or, 
realistically, as much of it as can feasibly be provided, and that a 
failure in this regard is unethical and unconstitutional, ‘legal 
professionals’ are ‘ethically underdeveloped’ to the extent to which 
they are unaware of this substantive failure. From here we can 
make a further connection to another aspect of our wish-list of 
virtues noted above by Rowe et al : namely, the ethical 
requirement for practitioners to ‘recogni[e] the broader 
implications of [their] work’. Reflection on these ‘broader 
implications’  leads to a wider remit for ‘considering the ‘interest 
and values of clients’ and ‘others’. Here, ironically, ‘others’ will 
increasingly  denote  persons who are unable to attain the status of 
being someone’s ‘client’.  Thus, these days, ‘Access to Justice’ 
becomes  automatically integrated into the notion of clinical legal 
education, and this substantive connection with formal ethical 
requirements appears  to require no deeply  theoretical 
justification: it is   simply accepted as a mark of well-rounded 
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ethical professionalism.  
 
This natural current of sympathy is to be welcomed, but it should 
not lead us to believe that autonomous ethical judgement in the 
professions descends automatically upon all practitioners  in all 
historical circumstances. Autonomy requires constant critical and 
deliberate reflection. Interestingly, however, the more closely we 
examine the jurisprudential rationale for maintaining access to 
justice and related constitutional and social entitlements, the more 
our fears about dogma and rigidity in engaging with substantive 
concerns are allayed. That is, what jurisprudential reflection on 
foundational values leads us to is not so much a list of 
conveniently concrete principles, but rather, insight into the   
method of their dynamic creation. 
 
Our view is  that the more clinical law students and practitioners 
come to understand the nature of rules, the more they understand 
what surrounds their ethical interpretation and application, and this 
surely must signal the start of the journey from the  mechanical and 
formal grasp of the problem,  towards the level of autonomous 
accomplishment required to deal with the problem professionally. 
There is, to be sure,  a great deal that is unedifying in the 
traditional debates between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, but 
there is much to be learned from the  challenge to law’s validity 
arising from the unavoidably ‘open texture’ of rules. It is this ‘open 
texture’ that fuels the perennial search for principles which are 
required to give semantic context and form to rules that will be, or 
might be, accorded the status of law.  Positivists and   Idealists 
might differ as to how, in preserving the distinction between law 
and morality, these principles might be incorporated as such in the 
form of procedurally recognisable sources, but but what emerges 
from the debate is an acknowledgement, reluctant or otherwise, of 
the dynamic nature of the recognition of sources. The educational, 
doctrinal, professional, procedural, and political problems of law 
are irreducibly ethical not simply because law is a form of 
normativity that demands pre-eminence and compliance, but 
because implicit in its every utterance is a claim to legitimacy. If 
the acquisition of legal skills requires an understanding of the 
values that underpin the legal enterprise, an encounter with the 
philosophical method that seeks to identify these values must 
necessarily be seen to be of great practical importance.    
 
Hart’s debate with Fuller24 about the 'inner morality of law' is as 
accessible as any, and this famous exchange devotes scrupulous 
                                                          
24
 H.L.A Hart “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”  Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 71, (I958).  593-629 at   p. 607. See, importantly   Fuller’s 
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critical attention to whether or not we can detect substantive ethical 
principle embedded in the very idea of a rule - regardless of its 
content. Once we invite Dworkin into this discussion the formal 
stability of the Black Letter gives way to a much more imaginative 
structure of creative interpretation where moral good sense reveals 
itself as legal substance in its own right. Dworkin's famous 
example in Riggs v Palmer of the ethical integrity required to make 
coherent sense of seemingly straightforward probate rules is as 
valuable to our understanding as it is simple. We might point out to 
students that (in the USA) probate ‘law’ is to be ignored and the 
principle that, 'a person should not profit from wrong doing", is to 
override it where appropriate. 25 Mechanical knowledge of this 
particular judgement – or several similar   to it – would surely be 
of practical and technical value, but it is not, of course, an 
indication that one has achieved a level of autonomous ethical 
maturity. Understanding from this illustration that the entire 
process of adjudication is structured by the constant search for 
cohesion between ethical principle and rules of  general  
applicability, is, however, a step towards it, and  it  offers to 
clinical educationalists   a clue   as to how progress might be 
encouraged in this regard. 
 
Bringing together the content of our model of the ‘matrix of 
concerns’ and establishing the  direction of philosophical analysis 
exemplified in the debate between Hart, Fuller and Dworkin offers 
a simple but perfectly coherent example of we understand by an 
interface of guided reflection: it is a  phase of experiential learning 
that can lead the clinical student to grasp the method by which  
mechanical and formal ethical requirements can be connected 
synthetically with substantive values. The interface could be said 
to amount to creating’ a zone of proximal development’. That can 
enable us to   break the bonds of formalism in our educational 
literature and discourses. ‘Knowing the law’ is an indispensable 
element of technical skill, but once it is revealed and accepted that 
there is an ethical dynamism and a creativity necessarily inherent 
in bringing legal rules into legitimate existence, then, the search for 
ethical principle, or the search for coherent principle overall, 
                                                                                                                                  
methodological comments in reply:  Lon L. Fuller “Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law: A Reply to Professor Hart” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71 No.4, 1958, pp. 
630-672. 
25
 See Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press )1977; also Law’s Empire ( Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 
1986 
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becomes an integral part of the professional understanding of the 
nature of legal practice.  
